Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 14

Number 4

Article 8

Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords,
and Militias. By Stephen Biddle. Princeton, CT: Princeton
University Press, April 2021.
Robert J. Bunker
C/O Futures, LLC

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss

pp. 107-110
Recommended Citation

Bunker, Robert J.. "Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerillas,
Warlords, and Militias. By Stephen Biddle. Princeton, CT: Princeton
University Press, April 2021.." Journal of Strategic Security 14, no. 4 (2021)
: 107-110.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.14.4.1992
Available at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol14/iss4/8
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Digital
Commons @ University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic
Security by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords,
and Militias. By Stephen Biddle. Princeton, CT: Princeton
University Press, April 2021.

This book review is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/
vol14/iss4/8

Bunker: Nonstate Warfare

Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerillas,
Warlords, and Militias. By Stephen Biddle. Princeton,
CT: Princeton University Press, April 2021. ISBN: 9780-691-20751-3. Hardcover. 434 pages. $35.00
Review by Robert J. Bunker, PhD
Futures, LLC

The author of Nonstate Warfare, Stephen Biddle, is a professor of
international and public affairs at Columbia University and an adjunct
senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).
He formerly held the Elihu Root chair in military studies at the U.S. Army
War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), has extensive Department of
Defense (DoD) policy experience, and is the author of Military Power:
Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, 2004). The
multi-year research study underpinning the book was financially
supported by several non-governmental and U.S. governmental entities as
well as a sizeable team of individuals who provided research, peer, and
professional review support. This pedigree immediately places the book in
the higher tier category of academic defense publications.
The focus of the work and its thesis are as follows:
to explore these military methods in detail, to describe more
carefully the differences of degree that distinguish the real
battlefield behavior of state and nonstate militaries, and to
explain the variations one observes when doing so. The
explanation I propose focuses on differences in the internal
political makeup of different nonstate actors—especially
their varying internal institutions and perceived stakes in the
wars they fight—as central causes of their observed behavior.
I contrast this political theory of nonstate behavior with
common alternative views that focus on non-state material
disadvantages or tribal culture, and I argue that internal
politics, in interaction with the nature of available
technology, offers a more successful explanation (p. xvi).
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The term ‘these’ refers to The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords,
and Militias found in the subtitle of the book. These military methods are
discussed in detail along a Fabian (Delaying)-Napoleonic (Battle)
Spectrum that includes stealth, holding ground, dispersion, coercive
strategic intent, and two forms of asymmetry—combatant (target lock) and
front/rear (spatial dynamics) methods (Table 2.1; pp. 26-39 discussion).
These methods, are in turn, modified by various actors ranked on the
Fabian-Napoleonic spectrum (Figure 2.1; pp. 39-45 discussion) by means
of their military behavior.
The book itself contains a list of figures, tables, and maps; a preface, ten
chapters, an appendix, notes and an index. The chapters are divided into
(1) Introduction; three chapters comprising a literature review and
methodology with dependent variable, and theory section; (2) The Fallacy
of Guerilla Warfare, (3) Materially Optimal Behavior, and (4) Politically
Achievable Behavior; case studies spanning five chapters; (5) Hezbollah in
the 2006 Lebanon Campaign, (6) The Jaish al Mahdi in Iraq, 2003-2008,
(7) The Somali National Alliance in Somalia, 1992-94, (8) The ZNG
(Croatian National Guard), HV (Croatian Ground Army), and SVK
(Serbian Army of Krajina) in the Croatian Wars of Independence, 1991-95,
(9) The Vietcong in the Second Indochina War, 1965-1968; and the final
study section (10) Conclusions and Implications. The work has a very tight
research design, an almost precision execution, is extensively referenced
with hundreds of citations in the notes section (pp. 337-424), and contains
a useful index. A bibliography would have been useful and larger font for
the notes would have been appreciated but this does not detract from the
study itself.
The most important components of Nonstate Warfare are its new theory
development and policy implications, which may appear counterintuitive
based on contemporary Department of Defense (DoD) perceptions. The
new theory component utilizing military behavior (as a dependent
variable) along the Fabian-Napoleonic spectrum is modified by actor
choice (which is materially optimal behavior seeking) “using a rationalist
causal logic with four independent variables: two that describe materiel
(numerical imbalance, and technological sophistication), and two that
describe internal politics (institutionalization and stakes)” (p. 46). The
case study results can be found in Table 10.1 and discuss the independent
variable values (materiel, tribal culture, and internal politics) and the
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theoretical predictions of the independent values along with the observed
outcome (p. 295).
The ‘so what’ component of the book that distinguishes it from more solely
academic efforts is the policy implications discussed by Biddle as they
relate to (a) future opponent’s military methods and (b) force structure
and modernization. The initial implications are that state and non-state
warfighting methods are overlapping (See Fig. 10.1; pp. 297-300
discussion) based on expected frequency of war-fighting methods
trending. The resulting implications—in this instance, ‘initial observations’
offered by Biddle (p. 301)—for the US government and DoD is that of a
2020s capability which is mid-tier (general purpose; ‘medium weight
version of the legacy force’) and which can respond to both low tech
(Fabian; wearing down) and high tech (Napoleonic; conventional and
precision targeting) threat forces (See Fig. 10.2; pp. 301-310).
Interestingly, befitting the academic elements of the work, implications for
scholarship are also offered. They center on determinants for state and
nonstate behaviors and the potentials for a “unified theory of state and
nonstate war making” (p. 310) which spans interstate and civil war
environments. The intent would be to remove subdiscipline stove piping
and bring back interdisciplinary approaches to studying a complex realworld phenomenon. This makes sense in our present era of immense
disruptive change and the challenges it is posing to the modern state form.
Both the blessing and the bane of the work is that it is “intellectually thick”
in the writing and flow. It reads like a clinical IR/defense policy research
study. While the author took pains (p. xviii) to write in natural language
and relegate the technical aspects of the work to the appendix (which
includes operationalizations, formulas, and spectrum scores), the
reviewer’s perception is that the reader still needs a graduate level
education to properly comprehend and validate (or question) the
methodology utilized in Biddle’s tome. Also, the Vietnam case study
utilized from 1965-1968 seems a bit temporally disassociated from the four
others spanning the 1991-2008 historical cluster. That case study,
however, could be considered a control group given the importance of the
Vietcong, their paradigmatic status to the American counterinsurgency
(COIN) experience, and the conduct of the conflict prior to the ‘advent of
precision firepower’ (p. 263).
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In summation, the work has been lauded for its innovation and
importance (as by Sir Lawrence Freedman) and does not disappoint in this
respect. It delves into the challenges posed by non-state warfare for the US
military and the liberal-democratic government to which it is subordinate.
This is an area in which we have a rather dismal track record. While great
power conflict is increasingly dominating our national security strategy
and would seem to minimize the need for the relevance of such a work, the
importance of COIN refuses to recede into the background given recent
events in Afghanistan, the potential resurgence of Salafist-Jihadi groups,
and ongoing Iranian-regime weaponization of Shia populations
throughout the world.
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